1031下車的人看起來年紀比較大,
應該是駕駛父親,
所以如果1031與1101駕駛都是肇事車主父親的話,
駕駛平常會在停車處前約1m處才完全鬆開電門,
剎車燈亮起,
滑一下停車.
駕駛有沒有再踩剎車不清楚,
根據駕駛描述他平常不用剎車都可以,
所以應該是"保持"的單踏板模式.
1105出事那天駕駛從住家出發的畫面顯示,
車子是可以停止,
剎車燈全亮的,
看起來是正常的,
說水泥廠好像距離住家約1公里,
駕駛開一公里後,
平常剎車燈應該亮起的位置沒亮起,
反而馬上略微加速並轉彎切入道路爆衝造成事故.
看1031的畫面,
駕駛從道路切進工廠前道路旁時,
剎車燈有亮一下,
這很正常,
在路上不能龜速行駛,
速度較快,
要進工廠前面停車前需要減速,
就是說就算駕駛一路順暢都沒有減速或剎車,
到工廠前面應該會減速一次.
就是說至少鬆開電門用動力回收減速,
如果失效沒有減速,
駕駛應該馬上會踩剎車,
如果剎車又失靈,
駕駛正常來說應該就會馬上切回馬路,
讓車子滑行到停止,
而不是往停車位子準備停車.
因為前面有個土坑不能過頭.
所以如果是動力回收失效,
或是剎車失靈,
正常來說從路面要切進路旁減速時,
應該就會發現了,
而不是最後幾乎快停止要停車時才發現動力回收失效,
以及剎車失效.
那就算駕駛開的真的很慢可以直接從道路上切進路旁停車,
所以無法提早發現動力回收失效,
或是剎車失效.
駕駛描述說自從要停車,
腳就放在剎車踏板上,
沒有碰油門.
當然這個描述其實是一開始兒子假裝是駕駛發文的,
兒子說他家的特斯拉停車模式是用"緩行",
就是同燃油車的蠕行方式.
根據駕駛描述他是踩剎車踏板與按P檔之後沒停,
才向左開上路面的.
問題是依照他平常的行慣,
在平常剎車燈亮起的位置,
他得要鬆開電門發現動力回收無效,
再踩剎車踏板無效,
再按P檔無效後,
才知道要左切,
應該已經往前好幾公尺可能進土坑了,
但實際畫面卻是車子在平常應該剎車燈亮起的位置,
反而開始加速,
這畫面其實比較符合車主平常應該最後鬆開電門,
讓剎車燈亮起時的行為沒做,
而是再踩深電門的狀況,
很像燃油車停車行為上身的狀況,
因為燃油車停車時如果用蠕行方式,
腳是放在剎車踏板上,
最後踩下剎車踏板停車.
會不會車主55歲年紀開始大了,
一大早沒有很清醒？
燃油車蠕行停車記憶上身？
或許駕駛之前都是開燃油自排車停那個位置有很多年了.
那車子開始加速,
駕駛有點嚇到馬上左切避免進土坑,
前方有機車快撞上,
駕駛真的以為是腳踩剎車失靈,
更用力踩,
再左切閃過機車,
此時就是畫面上特斯拉狂飆的開始.
後面就是駕駛描述的,
他認為一直踩著剎車可能一瞬間會有剎車,
所以就一直踩著剎車不放,
但實際上是踩著電門不放.
我猜那種全電門的扭力與加速,
時速198小路狂飆閃人閃車,
駕駛應該沒辦法看自己腳踩的是什麼踏板.
另外還有消息說救護人員去把駕駛父親救出來時,
駕駛的腳還踩在剎車踏板上,
證明駕駛踩的是剎車踏板,
最後撞擊的畫面不是有？
那種撞擊力人還能控制腳踩在固定位置就真的神奇了,
沒斷腿就偷笑了.
整件事來說,
駕駛平常停車關鍵的剎車燈亮起位置,
只要駕駛當時不是放開電門,
而是燃油車蠕行停車記憶的把電門當剎車又踩下去,
幾乎就完全符合監視器畫面與特斯拉的讀取資料了.
總之這事故我的看法是4個原因造成的:
1.駕駛停車誤踩電門.
2.緊急閃避土坑左切進入車道.
3.緊急閃避機車再左切.
4.連續兩次閃避讓駕駛慌張誤以為剎車失靈,緊踩剎車踏板不放,
實則踩著電門踏板不放,小路高速下一直閃避讓車主無法分心去確認自己踩的是什麼踏板.
再來若是我認為是兒子想把責任推給特斯拉的說法,
就是停車模式是設置為"緩行",
等同燃油車蠕行方式,
駕駛從住家出發時剎車燈有亮起,
表示駕駛有踩過剎車踏板,
那從住家到水泥廠1公里路程,
剎車失零機率極低,
一般剎車會失靈都是長下坡一直踩著剎車過熱,
或是駐車剎車沒放造成過熱,
這輛車算新,
卡鉗是名牌,
剎車油劣化或卡鉗卡死應該不會發生,
而且這些症狀通常是漸進式的,
通常駕駛會發現或是保養時就能檢查到或更換零件.
那一公里也不是下坡路段,
駐車剎車沒放的話從住家出發應該就有警示了,
不太可能就過熱,
加上最後要從路面切到路旁停車通常會踩剎車減速成滑行進入停車位,
幾乎快停止時最後一踩才發現剎車失零的機率根本超低,
那剎車系統就算特斯拉的系統崩潰,
還是能用沒助力方式剎車,
只是比較費力而已,
那有人說就是系統故障,
就算系統故障,
踩剎車踏板卡鉗還是能咬住碟盤,
不然這事件連BOSCH都要被特斯拉求償了,
踩剎車但又加油門硬開一定可以看到卡鉗與碟盤冒火花,
碟盤一定會過熱,
那碟盤過熱這表面顏色都會改變,
這都可以檢查的,
另外還有一種可能,
監視器住家與水泥廠時間上是有誤差,
但還是能判斷先後,
可能本來是兒子要去水泥廠開門,
將停車模式設為"緩行",
結果兒子要開出門時臨時改換父親開車去水泥工廠開門,
或是兩人一起開車出門,
兒子有事中途下車,
改父親開去水泥工廠,
父親上車忘了改平常用的"保持"模式,
結果最後要停車時鬆開電門車子依然蠕行,
一時緊張直接踩下電門當剎車造成的.
https://static.nhtsa.gov/odi/inv/2020/INCLA-DP20001-6158.PDF
3.5 System Safeguards
The APPS system used in the subject Tesla vehicles has numerous design features to
detect, and respond to, single point electrical faults, including: redundant position sensors, contactless inductive sensing technology, independent power and ground connections to the sensors, and sensor voltage curves that differ by a fixed ratio. All subject vehicles are equipped with accelerator pedal assemblies with two independent inductive sensors that convert the angular position of the pedal to voltage signals. The pedal position can only be changed in response to an external force being applied, such as the driver’s foot. The Drive Inverter main processor controls motor torque based on accelerator pedal voltage. A separate processor (Pedal Monitor) acts as a safety monitor, continually checking both APPS signals for faults and independently calculating motor torque. Any malfunction or deviation in the APPS system results in a fault mode, cutting torque to zero for driver pedal applications or regenerative braking. In addition, the Pedal Monitor can shut off the Drive Inverter if driver’s commanded motor torque and actual motor torque do not match.The APPS voltage signals pass through A/D (Analog/Digital) converters in the drive unit, which then reports the data to the Controller Area Network (CAN) communication bus.The CAN data are time stamped and stored at specified intervals by the data log. The RCM receives the data from the drive unit via the CAN bus. The data is buffered in the RCM random access
memory (RAM) and then written to the RCM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory (EEPROM) in the event of a non-deploy or deployment event.
3.7 Brake System
The subject vehicles are all equipped with pedal-actuated hydraulic brake systems that are completely independent of the motor control system. No common fault has been identified or postulated that would cause simultaneous malfunctions of the brake and motor control systems in the subject vehicles. Power assist is provided either electro-mechanically or from a dedicated vacuum pump. In addition, all subject vehicles have Tesla’s brake override logic that will cut motor torque if the brake and accelerator are applied at the same time. If the accelerator pedal is pressed before the brake pedal (or within 100 milliseconds of brake pedal), motor torque is reduced to zero. If the brake pedal is pressed and then the accelerator pedal, motor torque is
limited to 250 Nm and motor power is limited to 50 kW. In the latter condition, the driver should be able to hold the vehicle stationary regardless of accelerator pedal position with 85 to 170 N (19 to 38 lbf) of brake pedal force, depending on the platform Finally, the subject vehicles also contain Tesla’s Pedal Misapplication Mitigation (PMM) software which uses vehicle sensor data to identify potential pedal misapplications and cut motor torque to prevent or mitigate SUA crashes. ODI’s analysis found evidence of PMM activation in approximately 13 percent of crashes where log data was reviewed for SUA crashes. The effectiveness of the PMM activations have been limited by the fact that the original PMM
implementation is designed for conditions where the vehicle is traveling straight forward or rearward toward the collision obstacle. Most SUA crashes reviewed in this petition evaluation involved dynamic steering inputs (i.e., vehicles with steering angles of 180 degrees or greater when the SUA occurs) which the original implementation of PPM was not designed to address.
tgdlyg wrote:
看監視器畫面,1031...(恕刪)
潮州特斯拉車主的兒子, 帶著記者現場重現事發經過, 你的推論是錯誤的
https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1kM411k7ZS/?is_story_h5=false&p=1&share_from=ugc&share_medium=iphone&share_plat=ios&share_session_id=44338FBB-ED65-4746-9C8A-34C2331829AA&share_source=COPY&share_tag=s_i×tamp=1668549522&unique_k=5JFpcvh
按這裡檢視網頁
內文搜尋
從 APP 打開
X