andrew3688 wrote:
而且不怕死又不是壞事...(恕刪)
受老美和西方价值观的影响，会觉得这样不人道。
一将功成万骨枯
古人诚不欺我
四川高富帥 wrote:
不知道 當年東北淪陷區 满洲国伪政权的漢奸們 有沒有你這麼厚的臉皮！...(恕刪)
請你自重，不要滿嘴髒話。這個世界並非善於罵街的人就更有道理。
你啥都不懂，關我什麼事？
你說的都對，你開心就好。
那我是不是可以看了Kein Bund fürs Leben就可以说德国军队都是基佬顺带还偷女战友内裤？我是不是看了American Pie就可以说美国大学生道德败坏无耻之尤？看了Enemy at the Gates就可以说俄国佬步枪都不够拿机枪扫队友？
（换点轻松点），是不是看了傻逼电视剧海上孟府就可以怒赞德意志科学力世界第一？
是不是看了傻逼主持人的节目黄旭东就成了global第一军火商？
不要把自己的下限放到抗日神剧拥趸一个水平，这地方毕竟是个军事板块。
关于共军有没有普遍使用人海冲锋和防弹地主小媳妇。我知道的是朝战期间有一个师由于技战术水平低下，的确盲目使用过密集部队冲锋，下场很惨，后来的总评也各种被领导修理。至于总体上么，按美国人的说法，人海这个词是美国人自己生造的：
The Myth of Chinese "Human Sea" Tactics
Why do we have the myth of the Chinese "human sea" or "human wave" attack tactics against American troops in the Korean War?
The metaphor was journalism's rhetorical attempt to convey to readers the concept that American soldiers were attacked and defeated by immense, overwhelming numbers of the enemy. The metaphor of a gigantic human sea or neverending waves rolling in and over everything offered an easy but misleading picture of Korean battlea myth. It had no basis in fact. But the American press and the soldiers themselves were fond of the term and used it repeatedly in describing the odds UN forces faced in battle with the Chinese.
It was also used frequently in Pentagon releases and in Army communiqués. One could compile hundreds or thousands of such references. The Headquarters, X Corps, Special Report on the Chosin Reservoir itself uses this language, saying that the CCF struck with its ''human wave'' tactic against the 1st Marine Division.
What then was the method employed by a Chinese unit in a typical attack? In a strong and determined attack, the Chinese usually attacked initially in small groups, fire teams of four or five men, or in squad size, or sometimes platoon-sized skirmish parties. If the first squad perished, there was another behind it to take its place and continue the advance in the same track, and still another if needed. The Chinese hit the same spot of a defense line or a perimeter repeatedly until they had worn down the defenders of a small sector, who may have exhausted their ammunition or suffered continuing casualties in repelling repeated squad-sized skirmishers. Finally, a succeeding Chinese group would make a penetration at this point and quickly plunge ahead to the enemy rear or fan out to the flanks. Then larger numbers of waiting Chinese plunged through the small penetration. They seldom tried to annihilate an enemy group they had penetrated or overrun. Rather, their purpose was to create confusion and spread panic. When this happened, other Chinese forces that had passed around or infiltrated to the rear of the enemy position cut off the escape route or road running to rear communications and thereby created further casualties and more panic by ambushing those trying to withdraw.
In short, the Chinese tactic was to attack repeatedly on a narrow front in a deep column of platoons and, despite heavy early casualties, to continue doing so until a penetration had been effected. This tactic required that a Chinese company or battalion echelon itself in a column of squads and platoons to maintain the attack. In the meantime, an equally strong force tried to reach the enemy rear and cut off its line of communications and escape route and intercept reinforcements trying to reach the point of enemy frontal attack. These tactics won victory for the CCF in the Chinese civil war so recently ended. These tactics had also succeeded in the first CCF intervention in their Phase 1 battles in Korea in October 1950, when units of the CCF Fourth Field Army had destroyed two ROK divisions and one American regiment north of the Chongchon River in the Eighth Army sector. These same tactics worked well against Eighth Army in late November and early December in the west at the same time that Sung's divisions of the IX Army Group were preparing the trap at the Chosin Reservoir for the 1st Marine Division. The Chinese counter-attack against Eighth Army sent it reeling back south of the Chongchon in near panic, with that army seeking only to leave the Chinese far in its rear. But the 1st Marine Division did not react that way. It could not have done so even had it wanted to. It did not have an open rear. Therein lay a difference.
解放战争期间，华野和中野条件艰苦，既缺乏重装备，也缺乏时间整训新兵，被四野以及解放战士嘲笑过技战术落后，但是违背军事原则在狭窄地域投入过量部队冲锋？？？这事是赵子龙师在塔山干的........至于防弹地主小媳妇嘛，是真没看到过资料啊
欢迎你补充中外资料（论文，回忆录，书籍，etc.）来论证你的观点，而不是靠拉低整个板块的水平来说服自己
老夫跨高山越平原钻密林下深渠如履平地
萊因哈特羅格蘭 wrote:
難道"我的戰爭"是台灣拍的?
難道大陸廣電總局的人會比你的知識差?
韓戰老共有無使用人海戰術?
你倒是說說看?...(恕刪)
1、你前面發出這張照片，我問你它的出处是什麼，你就扔出“我的戰爭”的封面照片，那有什麼用？你並沒有證明這一張圖也是來自“我的戰爭”吧？
如果你覺得這個密集衝鋒，敵方閉著眼睛開槍也能打到人的場面是來自“我的戰爭”，那麼為何不爽快一點，說明它來自第幾分第幾秒的螢幕畫面？請你確認一下，不要再轉移話題了。
2、你前面說的是国共内战共軍用人海戰術，請不要理屈詞窮就直接轉移到韓戰。你先證明國共內戰中共軍100萬人對國軍500萬人，以一敵五如何人海戰術，再來辯論朝鮮戰爭好嗎？或者你直接承認你前面亂講，那麼馬上可以開始下一個話題。
萊因哈特羅格蘭 wrote:
因為國共內戰的人海戰術又不同了
拿平民當肉盾
我曾跟一個老兵聊過他在前線親眼看到
老共要地主和其婦孺拿著沾濕的棉被往前衝
子彈打上會被棉絮纏住
國軍確實有下不了手的情況
不然為何一堆"難民"跟著國軍跑
吃飽太閒嗎?
就算土改時期，被劃為“地主”身份的人，占總人口也不過1%左右。三大戰役的時候要想抓地主在前衝鋒，怕不是得搜遍一個省才湊得起軍級規模衝鋒的炮灰？萬一要是國軍考慮自己小命要緊，下得了手，豈不是白廢許多功夫？如果它真的有效，會被這麼愚蠢的戰術擊敗的軍隊又該有多愚蠢？應該算史無前例吧？
還煞有介事說什麼“我曾跟一個老兵聊過他在前線親眼看到”，不知道你是否知道參加過內戰的老兵現在至少90歲？你要是真的聊過，現在隨便一部手機都能錄音錄像，你去再找他談談，請他說明自己身份，在哪個地點那一場戰役見到這種場面好嗎？否則又是你自己說得開心，證據全無。
還是我前面說過的話：如果讀歷史的時候，智慧和邏輯思維能力不足以辨別如此簡單的謊言，會信以為真，甚至是故意編造，那麼最終只會被人嘲笑。
作為辯論另一方的我，並不在乎。
你啥都不懂，關我什麼事？
你說的都對，你開心就好。
四川高富帥 wrote:
请正面回答一下 中華民國這場戰爭 輸掉的是大陸还是台灣？
這場戰爭中 黄百韬黄维及其幾十萬大軍 請問是台灣人還是大陸人？ 此戰到底是中原淪陷還是台灣淪陷？到底是徐州被攻破 還是台北被攻破？
這篇文是討論淮海戰役戰史的，跟大陸和台灣話題好像差了一點距離，你要歪樓也要有限度。
淮海戰役並不是發生在大陸和台灣之間，所以你問“輸掉的是大陸还是台灣”、“台灣人還是大陸人”、“中原淪陷還是台灣淪陷”、“徐州被攻破 還是台北被攻破”，全無意義。你清楚你在參與討論的話題是什麼嗎？如果不清楚，請從第一樓開始看起比較符合社區禮儀。
四川高富帥 wrote:
來來來 說說你是什麼地方的人？是啥時候被共軍攻破淪陷的！挨了多少炮彈？吃了多少子彈？死了多少人？
這個倒是可以回答。我老家就在東南沿海，1949年的時候，胡璉部隊逃到我老家附近，就地抓了一千多青年，共軍追上來，胡璉沒有抵抗，帶著抓來的壯丁繼續逃到台灣去。
然後本地本來就有小股的共產黨遊擊隊，進城接管，迎接解放軍大部隊進城，幾天之間就解放了。本地的地主並沒有機會被共軍抓去衝鋒做炮灰呢 @萊因哈特羅格蘭
你啥都不懂，關我什麼事？
你說的都對，你開心就好。
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